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CASENOTES 
INSURANCE-PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY-INSURER 
MUST PROVE ACTUAL PREJUDICE TO ESCAPE 
LIABILITY BECAUSE OF LATE NOTICE BY INSURED 
WHERE CLAIMS-MADE POLICY IS AMBIGUOUS AS TO 
COVERAGE. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. House, 
315 Md. 328, 554 A.2d 404 (1989) (4-3 decision). 
Before an insurer! can disclaim coverage under a liability policy 
because of an insured's2 late notice, article 48A, section 482 of the 
Maryland Code requires the insurer to establish that it was actually 
prejudiced by the late notice.3 Actual prejUdice under section 482 
means that if the notice requirement had not been breached, it is 
likely that the insured would not have been liable.4 
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. House,s the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland faced the issue of whether section 482 
applies to claims-made insurance policies6 when the claim was not 
1. "The underwriter or insurance company with whom a contract of insurance is 
made. The one who assumes risk or underwrites a policy, or the underwriter 
or company with whom contract of insurance is made." BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 808 (6th ed. 1990). 
2. "The person who obtains or is otherwise covered by insurance on his health, 
life, or property. The 'insured' in a policy is not limited to the insured named 
in the policy, but applies to anyone who is insured under the policy." Id. 
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482 (1986). Entitled "Disclaimer of coverage 
because of lack of notice or cooperation from insured," § 482 provides the 
following: 
Id. 
Where any insurer seeks to disclaim coverage on any policy of liability 
insurance issued by it, on the ground that the insured or anyone 
claiming the benefits of the policy through the insured has breached 
the policy by failing to cooperate with the insurer or by not giving 
requisite notice to the insurer, such disclaimer shall be effective only 
if the insurer establishes, by a preponderance of affirmative evidence 
that such lack of cooperation or notice has resulted in actual prejudice 
to the insurer. 
4. See Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Rosenbaum, 30 Md. App. 74, 84, 351 A.2d 197, 
202 (1976) (interpreting the current version of § 482). 
5. 315 Md. 328, 554 A.2d 404 (1989). 
6. Claims-made (or discovery) policies "cover liability inducing events if and when 
a claim is made during the policy term, irrespective of when the events 
occurred." Parker, The Untimely Demise oj the "Claims Made" Insurance 
Form? A Critique oj Stine v. Continental Casualty Company, 1983 DET. c.L. 
REv. 25, 27. 
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made until after the policy had expired.7 The House court, however, 
chose not to address this issue because it found that the policy issued 
by St. Paul was ambiguous as to whether the claim was made when 
the insured was notified by his patient of the claim or when the 
insured reported the claim to the insurer.8 Because of this ambiguity, 
the court of appeals interpreted the policy in favor of the insured,9 
and held that section 482 applied to the factual setting in House. lO 
In response to the 1963 court of appeals decision in Watson v. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., II the General Assembly of 
Maryland enacted section 482,l2 In Watson, the automobile liability 
policy required that the insured give written notice to the insurer "as 
soon as practicable" in the event of an accident. 13 The insured was 
involved in an automobile accident and notified the insurer thirty-
six days later. 14 The insurer responded by sending the insured a 
reservation of rights letter, informing the insured that prompt notice 
of the accident had not been given. IS The insurer later brought suit 
and obtained a declaratory judgment to the effect that the insurer 
was not required to defend the insured nor required to pay for any 
judgments or expenses arising from the accident. 16 
The court of appeals in Watson affirmed the trial court's deci-
sionY The court reasoned that a requirement to notify the insurer 
as soon as practicable was a condition precedent which should be 
enforced like any other contract clause. 18 In addition, the court was 
7. House, 315 Md. at 330, 554 A.2d at 405. 
8. [d. at 333, 554 A.2d at 407. 
9. [d. at 340-41, 554 A.2d at 410. 
10. [d. at 341, 554 A.2d at 410-11. 
11. 231 Md. 266, 189 A.2d 625 (1963). 
12. Washington v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 60 Md. App. 288, 293, 482 A.2d 
503, 505 (1984) ("In response to the Court of Appeals decision in Watson, 
the Maryland General Assembly enacted Chapter 185 of the Laws of 1964, 
effective June 1, 1964. This statute is now codified as Section 482 of Article 
48A of the Maryland Code .... "), cert. denied, 302 Md. 289, 487 A.2d 292 
(1985). 
13. Watson, 231 Md. at 269, i89 A.2d at 626. Specifically the policy in Watson 
required: 
In the event of an accident, occurrence or loss, written notice con-
taining particulars sufficient to identify the Insured and also reasonably 
obtainable information. with respect to the time, place and circum-
stances thereof, and the names and addresses of the injured and of 
available witnesses, shall be given by or for the Insured to the 
Company or any authorized agents as soon as practicable. 
[d. at 269 n.l, 189 A.2d at 626 n.1. 
14. [d. at 269-70, 189 A.2d at 626. 
15. [d. at 270, 189 A.2d at 626. 
16. [d. at 269, 189 A.2d at 626. 
17. [d. at 276, 189 A.2d at 630. 
18. [d. at 271, 189 A.2d at 627. 
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unwilling to accept the insured's argument that the notice requirement 
violated public policy. 19 
The year following the Watson decision, the General Assembly 
of Maryland enacted section 482.20 One commentator has suggested 
three reasons which may have inspired the General Assembly to enact 
section 482.21 First, an "aura of unfairness" surrounds' a situation 
where an insurer is able to disclaim liability when it was not actually 
prejudiced by an insured's breach of a condition precedent. 22 Second, 
the Watson decision allowed "an unreasonable forfeiture" by per-
mitting the insurer to deny protection which was already paid for by 
the insured.23 Third, the Watson rule permitted victims of automobile 
accidents to remain uncompensated by their paid-for insurance cov-
erage. 24 
Outside of Maryland, courts and legislatures have dealt with the 
Watson-type result in various ways.25 Some jurisdictions have contin-
ued to follow the traditional rule that an insurer need not show that 
it was prejudiced by an insured's delay in giving notice.26 Other 
19. Id. at 272, 189 A.2d at 627. The insured contended that in a majority of 
jurisdictions insurers were required to show actual prejudice in order to be 
relieved of obligations under their policies. However, the court of appeals 
concluded that the actual prejudice rule was against the weight of authority. 
Id. 
20. Act of Apr. 7, 1964, ch. 185, 1964 Md. Laws 445 (codified as amended at 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482 (1986». The original enacted form of § 482 
appeared as follows: 
Where any insurer seeks to disclaim coverage on any policy of motor 
vehicle liability insurance issued by it, on the ground that the insured 
or anyone claiming the benefits of the policy through the insured has 
breached the policy by failing to ,cooperate with the insurer or by not 
giving requisite notice to the insurer, such disclaimer shall be effective 
only if the insurer establishes, by a preponderance of affirmative 
evidence that such lack of cooperation or notice has resulted in actual 
prejudice to the insurer. 
Id. at 445-46. In 1966, § 482 was repealed and re-enacted with only the words 
"motor vehicle" deleted from the statute. Act of Apr. 29, 1966, ch. 205, 1966 
Md. Laws 445 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482 (1986». 
21. See Note, A Legal Process Analysis for a Statutory and Contractual Construc-
tion of Notice and Proof of Loss Insurance Disclaimers-Government Em-
ployees Insurance Co. v. Harvey, 38 MD. L. REv. 299, 309-10 (1978). 
22. Id. at 309. 
23. Id. at 310. 
24.ld. 
25. See generally 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4732 (1981 & Supp. 
1989); Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Requiring Liability Insurer to Show 
Prejudice to Escape Liability Because of Insured's Failure or Delay in Giving 
Notice of Accident or Claim, or in Forwarding Suit Papers, 32 A.L.R. 4TH 
141 (1984 & Supp. 1990). 
26. See, e.g., Marez v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 286 (Colo. 1981); Security 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 436, 293 N.E.2d 76,340 
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courts hold that if delay in notice is unreasonable, a rebuttable 
presumption arises that the insurer was prejudiced by the delay, 
requiring the insured to prove that the delay was not prejudicial. 27 
Another position which some courts have taken is that prejudice to 
the insurer should be a factor in determining the reasonableness of 
the insured's delay in notice.28 
The modern trend and majority view is that an insurer must 
show that it was prejudiced by the insured's delay in order to avoid 
liability.29 Following the modern trend, Wisconsin30 and Massachusetts31 
N.Y.S.2d 902 (1972); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Scott, 236 Va. 116, 
372 S.E.2d 383 (1988). 
27. See, e.g., Tiedtke v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 222 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1969); 
Henschel v. Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co., 178 N.W.2d 409 (Iowa 1970); Zurich Ins. 
Co. v. Valley Steel Erectors, Inc., 13 Ohio App. 2d 41,233 N.E.2d 597 (1968). 
28. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Burgess, 474 So. 2d 634 (Ala. 
1985) (in uninsured motorist cases, prejudice to the insurer is a factor to be 
considered in determining the reasonableness of the delay); Illinois Ins. Guar. 
Fund v. Lockhart, 152 Ill. App. 3d 603, 504 N.E.2d 857 (1987) (absence of 
prejudice is a factor in determining whether notice was reasonable, but absence 
of prejudice does not nullify notice requirement); Sutton Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Notre Dame Arena, Inc., 108 N.H. 437, 237 A.2d 676 (1968) (absence of 
prejudice to the insurer is a factor to be considered in determining whether 
the insured's delay in providing notice is a substantial breach of the policy). 
29. See, e.g., Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 
Cal. Rptr. 285 (1978); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 320 A.2d 
345 (Del. 1974); Reliance Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Cos., 307 Minn. 338, 239 
N.W.2d 922 (1976); Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 
237 A.2d 870 (1968); Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. v. Esquibel, 94 N.M. 132, 
607 P.2d 1150 (1980); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 
193 (1977). See generally Annotation, supra note 25, § 5[a). 
30. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 631.81(1) (West 1980). Section 631.81(1) reads as follows: 
[d. 
Provided notice or proof of loss is furnished as soon as reasonably 
possible and within one year after the time it was required by the 
policy, failure to furnish such notice or proof within the time required 
by the policy does not invalidate or reduce a claim unless the insurer 
is prejudiced thereby and it was reasonably possible to meet the time 
limit. 
31. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 175, § 112 (1987). Section 112 provides: 
The liability of any company under a motor vehicle liability policy, 
as defined in section thirty-four A of chapter ninety, or under any 
other policy insuring against liability for loss or damage on account 
of bodily injury or death, or for loss or damage resulting therefrom, 
or on account of damage to property, shall become absolute whenever 
the loss or damage for which the insured is responsible occurs, and 
the satisfaction by the insured of a final judgment for such loss or 
damage shall not be a condition precedent to the right or duty of the 
company to make payment on account of said loss or damage. No 
such contract of insurance shall be cancelled or annulled by any 
agreement between the company and the insured after the said insured 
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have enacted statutes similar to Maryland's section 482.32 The other 
states that require insurers to show prejudice before disclaiming 
liability have done so by case law. 33 Most of the courts that have 
adopted the modern rule require that the omission or delay of notice 
be unreasonable or unexcused before prejudice to the insured is even 
considered.34 
Jurisdictions that have adopted a rule requiring insurers to show 
prejudice to escape liability have generally done so for two reasons. 
First, strictly applying conditions precedent in liability policies creates 
a forfeiture. 3s Second, since the purpose of a notice requirement is 
to protect the insurer's interest from being prejudiced, it is unfair 
for an insurer who is not prejudiced to escape liability simply because 
of late notice.36 
Prior to House, no Maryland case had considered the effect of 
section 482 on claims-made policiesY Claims-made policies, also 
known as discovery policies, have become increasingly popular over 
the past twenty years, especially in the area of professional liability 
insurance.38 Claims-made policies cover liability inducing events as 
long as the claim is made during the policy term, regardless of when 
the event occurred.39 Occurrence policies, on the other hand, "cover 
liability inducing events occurring during the policy term, irrespective 
of when the actual claim is presented."40 There are also policies 
has become responsible for such loss or damage, and any such 
cancellation or annulment shall be void. An insurance company shall 
not deny insurance coverage to an insured because of failure of an 
insured to seasonably notify an insurance company of an occurrence, 
incident, claim or of a suit founded upon an occurrence, incident or 
claim, which may give rise to liability insured against unless the 
insurance company has been prejudiced thereby. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
32. See supra note 3. 
33. See supra note 29. 
34. See, e.g., Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 94, 237 
A.2d 870, 874 (1968); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 72, 371 
A.2d 193, 196 (1977). 
35. See, e.g., Ouellette v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 495 A.2d 1232 (Me. 
1985); Cooper, 51 N.J. at 93-94, 237 A.2d at 873; Brakeman, 472 Pa. at 73-
74, 371 A.2d 196-97. 
36. See, e.g., Weaver Bros., Inc. v. Chappel, 684 P.2d 123, 125 (Alaska 1984); 
Miller v. Marcantel, 221 So. 2d 557, 559 (La. Ct. App. 1969); Brakeman, 472 
Pa. at 75, 371 A.2d at 197. 
37. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. House, 73 Md. App. 118, 122, 533 A.2d 
301, 303 (1987) ("this case presents an issue of first impression"), afl'd, 315 
Md. 328, 554 A.2d 404 (1989). 
38. See Parker, supra note 6, at 28-29; Comment, The "Claims Made" Dilemma 
in Professional Liability Insurance, 22 UCLA L. REv. 925, 926 (1975). 
39. See Parker, supra note 6, at 27. 
40. Id. The United States Supreme Court contrasted claims-made and occurrence 
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which are hybrids of the claims-made and occurrence policies.41 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland for the first time discussed 
the claims-made policy in Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance 
Co. v. Vollmer.42 In Vollmer, the court of appeals contrasted claims-
made and occurrence policies.43 The court indicated that claims-made 
policies developed out of a need to deal with situations where "an 
error, omission, or negligent act is difficult to pinpoint and may 
have occurred over an extended period of time."44 The Vollmer court 
noted that claims-made policies enable insurers to underwrite risks, 
compute premiums, and establish reserves with greater accuracy 
because insurers know that their liability is limited to the term of 
the policy. 4S 
policies in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978). 
"An 'occurrence' policy protects the policyholder from liability for any act 
done while the policy is in effect, whereas a 'claims made' policy protects the 
holder only against claims made during the life of the policy." [d. at 535 n.3. 
A frequently cited definition of claims-made and occurrence policies appears 
in Samuel N. Zarpas, Inc. v. Morrow, 215 F. Supp. 887, 888 (D.N.J. 1963): 
In a discovery policy the coverage is effective if the negligent or 
omitted act is discovered and brought to the attention of the insurance 
company during the period of the policy, no matter when the act 
occurred. In an occurrence policy the coverage is effective if the 
negligent or omitted act occurred during the period of the policy, 
whatever the date of discovery. 
[d. Another commentator has described the distinction between claims-made 
and occurrence policies as follows: 
In the "occurrence" policy, the peril insured is the "occurrence" 
itself. Once the "occurrence" takes place, coverage attaches even 
though the claim may not be made for some time thereafter. While 
in the "claims made" policy, it is the making of the claim which is 
the event and peril being insured and, subject to policy language, 
regardless of when the occurrence took place. 
Kroll, The Professional Liability Policy "Claims Made," 13 FORUM 842, 843 
(1978). 
41. See Parker, supra note 6, at 27-28. 
42. 306 Md. 243, 508 A.2d 130 (1986). The Vollmer decision was in response to 
a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland where an insurer sought reimbursement for monies paid on behalf 
of the insured. [d. at 244, 508 A.2d at 130. The court of appeals held in favor 
of the insured, ruling that the claims-made policy in question covered claims 
of malpractice allegedly committed after the policy's retroactive date. [d. at 
256, 508 A.2d at 136. 
43. [d. at 253, 508 A.2d at 135 (quoting Stine v. Continental Casualty Co., 419 
Mich. 89,98, 349 N.W.2d 127, 131 (1984». 
44. [d. (quoting Stine, 419 Mich. at 99, 349 N.W.2d at 131). "Examples include 
a physician's misdiagnosis, an attorney's fraudulent concealment, or an archi-
tect's defective design. From an underwriting perspective, occurrence policies 
are unrealistic for such risks because of the long or open 'tail' exposure which 
results." [d. (quoting Stine, 419 Mich. at 99, 349 N.W.2d at 131). 
45. [d. at 254, 508 A.2d at 135 (quoting Stine, 419 Mich. at 99-100, 349 N.W.2d 
at 131). 
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The Vollmer decision also explained some of the variations of 
the claims-made policy. A claims-made policy can be written to cover 
all claims made within the policy period regardless of when the act 
or omission was deemed to have occurred.46 On the other end of the 
spectrum is the claims-made policy which requires that the claim be 
made during the term of the policy and that the act or omission 
have occurred during the term of the policy.47 The claims-made policy 
at issue in Vollmer was between these two extremes-the claim must 
have been made during the policy and the act or omission must have 
allegedly occurred after the policy's retroactive date.48 
A survey of cases decided outside of Maryland that have consid-
ered the effect of a prejudice requirement where a claims-made insured 
gave no notice of the claim within the policy period reveals that as a 
general rule insurers need not prove prejudice to escape liability. 49 In 
Gulf Insurance Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis,50 the insured, a law 
firm, had a professional liability claims-made policy for the period 
from November 20, 1978 to November 20, 1979.51 The policy "required 
that the claim arise for services performed during the policy period; 
that the claim be known to or made against the insured during the 
said period; and that the insured notify the insurer thereof during said 
period."52 On November 19, 1979, the insured received notice of a 
malpractice claim from a former client.53 The insured did not notify 
its insurer of this claim until February 12, 1980,54 at which time the 
46. Id. at 256, 508 A.2d at 136. 
47. Id. (citing Stine, 419 Mich. at 94, 349 N.W.2d at 129). 
48. Id. ("To determine coverage it thus becomes necessary not only to look at the 
date when the claim was made, but also to determine if the retroactive date 
requirement has been satisfied. "). The "retroactive date" is the first day of 
coverage of a claims-made policy. Services rendered on or after the retroactive 
date are covered under the policy, so long as the claim relating to these services 
is made while the policy is still in effect. See R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, 
INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, 
AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 5.1O(d)(3), at 598 (Student ed. 1988). 
49. See, e.g., City of Harrisburg v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 5% F. 
Supp. 954 (M.D. Pa. 1984), aiI'd without opinion, 770 F.2d 1067 (3d Cir. 1985); 
Gulf Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1983); Zuckerman 
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 304, 495 A.2d 395 (1985). 
50. 433 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1983). 
51. Id. at 513. 
52.Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 514. On November 20, 1979, the insured had entered into a new claims-
made policy with a different insurance carrier. Id. at 513. The insured notified 
its new insurance carrier of the claim on December 6, 1979. Id. The new 
insurance carrier informed the insured on January 16, 1980 that the claim 
would not be covered because the claim was known to the insured before the 
new policy was issued. Id. at 513-14. 
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insurer denied coverage because it was not notified during the policy 
period. 55 
The Supreme Court of Florida in Dolan held that claims-made 
policies require notice to be given during the policy period.56 Dolan 
reasoned that if a court were to allow claims to be made after the 
policy period, the insured would be receiving more than it bargained 
for. 57 The court noted that some claims-made policies allow for the 
insured to report a claim to the insurer within a specified period 
after the policy ends.58 The Dolan court concluded by noting that 
the insured had the option of purchasing an endorsement which 
would have extended the reporting period, but the insured chose not 
to purchase this extended coverage. 59 
In City of Harrisburg v. International Surplus Lines Insurance 
CO.,6O the insured, the Mayor of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, was 
covered under a claims-made "Public Officials and Employees Lia-
bility Insurance" policy. 61 The insurer denied liability and refused to 
defend the insured because it did not receive notice of the insured's 
claim until the policy had expired.62 The insured argued that under 
Pennsylvania law, an insurer has a duty to show prejudice from late 
notice before coverage can be denied.63 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania in City of Harrisburg held that the Pennsylvania 
55. [d. at 514. 
56. [d. at 515 ("Coverage depends on the claim being made and reported to the 
insurer during the policy period."). The Dolan court contrasted claims-made 
policies with occurrence policies by noting that in occurrence policies, "[c]overage 
depends on when the negligent act or omission occurred and not when the 
claim was asserted." [d. 
57. [d. at 515-16 ("This extension of coverage, by the court, so very different 
from a mere condition of the policy, in effect rewrites the contract between 
the parties. This we cannot and will not do."). 
58. [d. at 516 (citing James & Hackworth v. Continental Casualty Co., 522 F. 
Supp. 785 (N.D. Ala. 1980»; Graman v. Continental Casualty Co., 87 Ill. 
App. 3d 896, 409 N.E.2d 387 (1980); Troy & Stalder Co. v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 206 Neb. 28, 290 N.W.2d 809 (1980); Gereboff v. Home Indem. 
Co., 119 R.I. 814, 383 A.2d 1024 (1978». 
59. [d. The insured in Dolan had 30 days from the termination of the policy to 
exercise this endorsement option. [d. at 516 & n.2. 
60. 596 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Pa. 1984), a/I'd without opinion, 770 F.2d 1067 (3d 
Cir. 1985). 
61. [d. at 958. 
62. [d. at 957. 
63. [d. at 960. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in Brakeman v. Potomac 
Insurance Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977), that "where an insurance 
company seeks to be relieved of its obligations under a liability insurance policy 
on the ground of late notice, the insurance company will be required to prove 
that the notice provision was in fact breached and that the breach resulted in 
prejudice to its position." [d. at 75-77, 371 A.2d at 198. 
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prejudice rule applies only to occurrence policies and is inapplicable 
to claims-made policies.64 The court gave three reasons why an insurer 
should not be expected to show prejudice when a claims-made insured 
fails to notify its insurer during the policy period. First, the insured 
could have either purchased an occurrence policy or obtained a policy 
with an extended discovery period.6s Second, finding for the insurer 
gave the insured exactly what was bargained for. 66 Third, notice 
provisions in claims-made policies serve a materially different purpose 
than notice provisions in occurrence policiesY In claims-made poli-
cies, notice clauses give the insurer a specific date after which the 
insurer knows that it is no longer liable under the policy. 68 This 
allows for the insurer to fix more accurately its reserves and to 
compute premiums with greater certainty.69 
In Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. ,70 the insurer 
provided the insured, an attorney, with claims-made professional 
liability coverage from January 15, 1974 through February 25, 1982.71 
On December 28, 1982, the insured notified his insurer of a pending 
malpractice suit, and he requested that the insurer defend and in-
demnify him in the event of liability. 72 The insurer denied coverage 
because the insured did not give notice of the claim until after the 
policy term had expired.73 The insured's policy "afforded him cov-
erage for acts or omissions occurring at any time, provided that the 
claim be asserted and reported to the carrier during the policy 
period. "74 
64. City oj Harrisburg, 596 F. Supp. at 962. 
65. Id. The City oj Harrisburg court did not agree with the insured's contention 
\hat there was an inequality of bargaining power which forced the insured to 
take the coverage offered. Id. at 962 n.8. 
66. Id. at 962 ("accepting the insurer's argument would not involve a forfeiture 
since the insured has paid a lower premium for coverage that is retrospective 
only"). 
67. Id. at 961. In an occurrence policy, the purpose of the notice provision is "to 
give the insurer time to investigate the claim for defense or settlement." Id. 
at 962. 
68.Id. 
69.Id. 
70. 100 N.J. 304, 495 A.2d 395 (1985), noted in Oettle & Howard, Zuckerman 
and Sparks, The Validity of "Claims Made" Insurance Policies as a Function 
of Retroactive Coverage, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 659 (1986). 
71. Zuckerman, 100 N.J. at 306, 495 A.2d at 396. In February 1982, the insured 
was given the opportunity to purchase an extended reporting endorsement, 
which he chose not to purchase. Id. at 309, 495 A.2d at 397. 
72. Id. at 307, 495 A.2d at 396. 
73. Id. The insured did not notify the insurer "because he believed that the claim 
was 'minimal' and could be settled within the deductible limits of his insurance 
policy." Id. 
74. Id. at 308, 495 A.2d at 397. The trial court granted summary judgment for 
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Zuckerman held that no 
consideration of public policy prevented the court from enforcing 
the claims-made policy at issue,1s and that the New Jersey prejudice 
rule'6 did not apply to claims-made policies which met the reasonable 
expectations of an insured. 77 Therefore, the insurer was not obligated 
to defend or indemnify the insured. The Zuckerman court admitted 
that members of the public could be "seriously disadvantaged" where 
an insured fails to notify its insurer before the claims-made policy 
expires.7s The court addressed this point, however, by adding that 
the public is no worse off than in situations where a professional is 
either uninsured or has let his or her occurrence policy lapse. 79 
Zuckerman also offered reasoning similar to that given in Dolan 
and City of Harrisburg. The Zuckerman court said that the prejudice 
rule should not apply to claims-made policies because of the inherent 
difference between notice requirements in claims-made policies and 
those in occurrence policies.so The court refused to extend the notice 
period because an extension would give the insured "an unbargained-
the insured on the ground that the insurer had not demonstrated any prejudice 
resulting from the insured's late notice. Id. at 309, 495 A.2d at 398. The 
appellate division reversed, holding that the insurer should not be required to 
show prejudice under a claims-made policy where notice is not given until after 
the policy term has expired. Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 194 
N.J. Super. 206, 216, 476 A.2d 820, 825 (App. Div. 1984). 
75. Zuckerman, 100 N.J. at 321, 495 A.2d at 404. "In only a smail number of 
cases that presented special factual circumstances have courts refused to uphold 
the coverage limitations of 'claims made' policies." Id. at 317, 495 A.2d at 
402. These instances have occurred where the policy language was ambiguous. 
Id. 
76. The New Jersey prejudice rule provides that it is "appropriate to hold that 
the carrier may not forfeit the bargained-for protection unless there are both 
a breach of the notice provision and a likelihood of appreciable prejudice." 
Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 94, 237 A.2d 870, 
874 (1968). 
77. Zuckerman, 100 N.J. at 324, 495 A.2d at 406. "The Cooper doctrine has a 
clear application to policies analogous to the automobile liability policy there 
involved. It has, however, no application whatsoever to a 'claims made' policy 
that fulfills the reasonable expectations of the insured with respect to the scope 
of coverage." Id. 
78. Id. at 322, 495 A.2d at 404. 
79. Id. at 322, 495 A.2d at 404-05. The Zuckerman court stated: 
The potential for public injury derives more from the termination or 
nonexistence of coverage than it does from the form of the policy. 
Accordingly, we do not consider the standard "claims made" form 
of coverage to contravene public policy either from the standpoint of 
the professional or the professional's clients. 
Id. at 322, 495 A.2d at 405. 
80. Id. at 323-24, 495 A.2d at 405-06. The notice requirement in an occurrence 
policy aids "the insurance carrier in investigating, settling, and defending 
claims." Id. at 323, 495 A.2d at 406. 
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for expansion of coverage. "81 The Zuckerman court added that if it 
had ruled in favor of the insured, the cost of claims-made insurance 
in New Jersey would have increased as a result. 82 
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. House,83 Horner C. 
House, M.D., and his professional association, Horner C. House, 
M.D., P.A., had a series of claims-made physicians and surgeons 
professional liability policies with St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance 
beginning January 1, 1983 and ending January 1, 1986.84 The St. 
Paul policy gave Dr. House the opportunity to purchase an optional 
reporting endorsement which would have extended his reporting 
period, but Dr. House chose not to exercise this option.85 On October 
29, 1984, Dr. House performed surgery on Ms. Shirley J. Platzer 
and allegedly left part of a needle in her knee.86 The needle was 
removed on November 27, 1984.81 
Dr. House received letters from counsel for Ms. Platzer, dated 
June 21, 1985 and September 16, 1985, stating a claim for damages 
and advising Dr. House to turn the matter over to his insurance 
carrier.88 On November 15; 1985, Ms. Platzer filed a claim with the 
81. [d. at 324, 495 A.2d at 406. "In exchange for limiting coverage only to claims 
made during the policy period, the carrier provides the insured with retroactive 
coverage for errors and omissions that took place prior to the policy period." 
[d. 
82. [d. ("So material a modification in the terms of this form of insurance widely 
used to provide professional liability coverage both in this State and throughout 
the country would be inequitable and unjustified. "). 
83. 315 Md. 328, 554 A.2d 404 (1989). 
84. [d. at 330, 554 A.2d at 405. The policy had a retroactive date of January 1, 
1977. [d. 
85. [d. at 338, 554 A.2d at 409. The policy described the optional reporting 
endorsement as follows: 
Your professional coverage may end because one of us chooses to 
cancel or not renew it. If this happens, you have the right to buy an 
optional extension of coverage. It's called a reporting endorsement. 
This reporting endorsement will cover: 
-Injuries or deaths that occur after the retroactive date and 
before that [sic] date this agreement ends. And 
-Claims that are first made or reported to us after the ending 
date of this agreement and before the reporting endorsement 
ends. 
You must request the reporting endorsement in writing within 30 days 
after this agreement ends. We'll then sell it to you for a premium 
based on the rules and rating plans we're using on the day the 
reporting endorsement begins. 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. House, 73 Md. App. 118, 132, 533 A.2d 301, 
308 (1987) (emphasis omitted), aiI'd, 315 Md. 328, 554 A.2d 404 (1989). 
86. House, 315 Md. at 331, 554 A.2d at 405. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. "The record indicates that Dr. House took no action in response to these 
communications." House, 75 Md. App. at 119, 533 A.2d at 302. 
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Health Arbitration Claims Board, and she properly served Dr. House 
on January 6, 1986.89 On February 12, 1986, Dr. House reported the 
incident to Swope-Offut & Company, Inc., St. Paul's agent, and St. 
Paul learned of the claim shortly thereafter. 90 St. Paul declined to 
defend Dr. House on the ground that notice was not received within 
the policy period, and that therefore, the claim was not a covered 
risk.91 
On July 1, 1986, Dr. House filed a declaratory judgment action 
in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City,92 seeking an order requiring 
St. Paul to represent him before the Health Claims Arbitration Board 
in the Platzer case.93 Dr. House argued that section 48294 required 
St. Paul to prove that it was actually prejudiced by Dr. House's late 
notice before it could deny coverage.9S Both St. Paul and Dr. House 
moved for summary judgment.96 The trial court held that as a matter 
of law section 482 was applicable, granted Dr. House's motion for 
summary judgment, and ordered St. Paul to defend Dr. House in 
his case before the Health Claims Arbitration Board.97 
St. Paul appealed to the court of special appeals, arguing that 
section 482 should not apply to claims-made notice provisions where 
an insured fails to notify its insurer until after the policy period has 
expired.98 St. Paul contended that applying section 482 to claims-
89. House, 315 Md. at 331, 554 A.2d at 405-06. 
90. House, 73 Md. App. at 120, 533 A.2d at 302. 
91. House, 315 Md. at 331, 554 A.2d at 406. 
92. Circuit Court Judge Thomas Ward presided. [d. at 328, 554 A.2d at 404. 
93. [d. at 331, 554 A.2d at 406. 
94. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482 (1986); see supra note 3 (quoting § 482). 
95. House, 315 Md. at 331, 554 A.2d at 406. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. The trial judge, in a written opinion concluded: 
[T]his Court finds that the language of Section 482 is dispositive of 
the issue. The language of our Maryland General Assembly says what 
it says, and should not be bent or twisted and given meaning beyond 
that intended by our legislative bodies. If claims made policies are to 
be exempted, then the Maryland General Assembly must say it. 
As to the issue of prejudice itself, it would be premature for this 
Court to determine this issue, for this is a matter to be determined 
by the trial court (panel). The Defendant must defend the Plaintiff's 
case before the Health Claims Arbitration Panel, and the issue of 
prejudice, if raised, must be determined by that Honorable body. 
Section 482 of the Maryland Insurance Code applies to this case, and 
requires that the Defendant establish actual prejudice before it can 
disclaim coverage due to the Plaintiff's late notice of claim. 
Brief for Appellant at app. 8-9, House (No. 87-186). 
98. House, 73 Md. App. at 121, 533 A.2d at 303. "Appellant notes that in a 
'claims made' policy the 'operative event' pertinent to the insurer's liability is 
the date of notification to the insurer; in an 'occurrence' policy, however, the 
operative event is the date of the allegedly negligent act." [d. 
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made policies amounted to rewriting the policy and giving the insured 
more coverage than was bargained for. 99 Dr. House argued that the 
plain language of section 482, and the court of special appeals' earlier 
applications of section 482, mandated that the statute should apply 
to the claims-made policy. 100 
The court of special appeals in House101 considered the differ-
ences between occurrence and claims-made policies,102 and examined 
the holdings in Do/an, City of Harrisburg, and Zuckerman. l03 The 
court found that the claims-made policy at issue "unambiguously" 
stated that a claim was made on the date an incident or injury was 
reported to St. Paul or its agent. 104 Although the court thought St. 
Paul's arguments and cases in support to be persuasive, it found the 
language of section 482 to be dispositive, and as a result, it affirmed 
the trial court's decision. lOS 
The court of appeals in House granted certiorari to determine 
whether section 482 applies when an insurer maintains that there is 
no coverage under a claims-made insurance policy because the insured 
failed to make the claim within the policy period. I06 The four-member 
majoritylO1 found, however, that this issue was not presented in 
House because the policy in question was ambiguous as to whether 
a claim was made when the insured reported an incident or injury 
to the insurer or when the insured became aware of an incident or 
injury. lOS The House court reasoned that the ambiguity should be 
resolved against the party who drafted the policy.l09 As a result of 
99. [d. at 121-22, 533 A.2d at 303. 
100. [d. at 122, 533 A.2d at 303. Dr. House referred to Washington v. Federal 
Kemper Ins. Co., 60 Md. App. 288, 482 A.2d 503 (l984), cert. denied, 302 
Md. 289, 487 A.2d 292 (1985) and Medical Mutual Liability Ins. Soc'y of Md. 
v. Miller, 52 Md. App. 602, 451 A.2d 930 (l982). 
101. The three-judge panel at the court of special appeals consisted of Chief Judge 
Gilbert, Judge Alpert, and Judge Rosalyn B. Bell, and Judge Alpert issued the 
opinion. House, 73 Md. App. at 119, 533 A.2d at 301. 
102. [d. at 122-25, 533 A.2d at 303-05. 
103. [d. at 125-31, 533 A.2d at 305-07. For a discussion of these cases, see supra 
notes 49-82 and accompanying text. 
104. House, 73 Md. App. at 132, 533 A.2d at 308. "Information relating to the 
'type of claim . . . anticipate[d), must be supplied to St. Paul. Thus, the 
insured, not a third party, 'makes the claim' by reporting an incident or 
injury." [d. 
105. [d. at 132-35, 533 A.2d at 308-09. "[T]he policy at issue ... clearly falls 
within the language of the statute. The language of the statute is very broad, 
and we find nothing to suggest an intent to exclude 'claims made' type policies." 
[d. at 135, 533 A.2d at 309. 
106. House, 315 Md. at 330, 554 A.2d at 405 (1989). 
107. The majority consisted of Judges Eldridge, Cole, Rodowsky, and Adkins, and 
Judge Rodowsky issued the opinion. See id. at 329-30, 554 A.2d at 404-05. 
108. [d. at 330, 333, 554 A.2d at 405, 407. 
109. [d. at 340-41, 554 A.2d at 410. 
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the ambiguity, and the alternative interpretation of when a claim 
could be made, the court of appeals held that section 482 was 
applicable to the claims-made policy at issue in House, and affirmed 
the decision of the court of special appeals. IIO 
The House court explained its alternative interpretation theory 
by starting with the premise that the "ordinary meaning" of when 
a claim is made "refers to the assertion of a claim by or on behalf 
of the injured person against the insured."11I The court then examined 
the following two clauses of the 8t. Paul policy which gave rise to 
the ambiguity: 
WHEN YOU'RE COVERED [Basic Coverage Clause] 
To be covered the professional service must have been 
performed (or should have been performed) after your ret-
roactive date that applies. The claim must also first be made 
while this agreement is in effect. 
WHEN IS A CLAIM MADE? [Accelerated Coverage Clause] 
A claim is made on the date you first report an incident or 
injury to us or our agent. You must include the following 
information: 
-Date, time and place of the incident. 
-What happened and what professional service you per-
formed. 
- Type of claim you anticipate. 
-Name and address of injured party. 
-Name and address of any witness. 1I2 
The court found that the first clause fit the court's "ordinary 
meaning" of when a claim is made.1I3 As for the second clause, the 
court stated that the provision could be construed to require the 
reporting of a claim during the policy period, but that since the 
insured had to report the type of claim anticipated, the clause only 
addressed part of the claims spectrum. 1I4 
The House court examined 8t. Paul's optional reporting en-
dorsement, which Dr. House had elected not to purchase, to show 
that 8t. Paul's definition of "when a claim is made" was inconsistent 
within the policy. liS The optional reporting endorsement read in 
pertinent part: 
This reporting endorsement will cover: 
- Injuries or deaths that occur after the retroactive date and 
110. [d. at 341, 554 A.2d at 410-11. 
111. [d. at 333, 554 A.2d at 407. 
112. [d. at 334-35, 554 A.2d at 407 (court's emphasis). 
113. [d. at 335, 554 A.2d at 407. 
114. [d. at 335, 554 A.2d at 407-08. 
115. [d. at 338, 554 A.2d at 409. 
596 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 19 
before that date this agreement ends. And 
-Claims that are first made or reported to us after the 
ending date of this agreement and before the reporting 
endorsement ends",6 
The court interpreted this endorsement as requiring either the re-
porting of the claim to the insured or the reporting of the claim to 
the insurer within the policy period. 1I7 Therefore, the court held that 
reporting to the insurer could not be the exclusive meaning of "when 
a claim is made" as St. Paul had contended.1l8 
The court of appeals also briefly examined the decisions in 
Zuckerman and City of Harrisburg, 119 but it found that the claims-
made policies in those cases clearly required an insured to report 
claims to the insurer within the policy period. 120 In addition, the 
court gave a public policy reason for why it should hold against St. 
Paul. The court said that St. Paul's interpretation of when a claim 
was made means that reporting a claim "becomes increasingly more 
difficult the closer a claim is made (in the ordinary meaning) to a 
policy's expiration."121 This problem, the court held, is avoided if 
116. [d. (court's emphasis). 
117. [d. at 339, 554 A.2d at 409. 
118. [d. 
119. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 60-82 and accompanying text. 
120. House, 315 Md. at 335-37, 554 A.2d at 408. The policy in Zuckerman v. 
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 304, 495 A.2d 395 (1985) read in 
pertinent part: 
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall 
become legally obligated to pay as money damages because of any 
claim or claims first made against the insured and reported to the 
company during the policy period, arising out of an act or omission 
of the insured in rendering .. \ professional services for others .... 
[d. at 307, 495 A.2d at 396-97. The coverage clause of the policy in City of 
Harrisburg v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. 
Pa. 1984), a/I'd without opinion, 770 F.2d 1067 (3d Cir. 1985) read: 
The Company will pay on behalf of the Insureds all Loss the Insureds 
shall be legally obligated to pay for any civil claim or claims first 
made against them because of a Wrongful Act, provided that the 
claim is first made during the policy period and written notice of said 
claim is received by the Company during the policy period. 
[d. at 958. The House court also considered the case of New England Rein-
surance Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 654 F. Supp. 742 (C.D. Cal. 
1986), rev'd, 822 F.2d 887, vacated, withdrawn, reh'g granted, 829 F.2d 840 
(9th Cir. 1987), but it found that the case also clearly required reporting within 
the policy period. House, 315 Md. at 336-37, 554 A.2d at 408 (insurer was 
obligated "to indemnify the insured on account of damages paid 'because of 
any claim or claims . . . first made against the insured and reported to the 
Company during the policy period."'). 
121. House, 315 Md. at 340, 554 A.2d at 410. "If coverage can be obtained only 
by reporting, reporting ultimately becomes practically impossible within the 
policy period, e.g., when the injured person asserts an unanticipated claim late 
on the last day of the policy period." [d. 
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the "ordinary meaning" is used for defining "when a claim is 
made. "122 The court concluded by adding that St. Paul did not make 
clear its definition of when a claim was made, at least in part, 
because the plain Englishl23 language of the policy sacrificed the 
"precision of language on the finer points of coverage. "124 
There are some weaknesses in the court of appeals' reasoning in 
House. First, the court raised the ambiguity issue sua sponte, and 
resolved the case only on that issue. Neither St. Paul, nor Dr. House, 
nor the court of special appeals saw any ambiguity in the policy. 125 
Dr. House conceded that under the St. Paul policy a claim could 
only be made "when the insured notifies the insurer that a claim 
has been made against him."I26 Moreover, neither party briefed the 
ambiguity issue. 127 Second, the majority used the optional reporting 
endorsement to establish ambiguity, even though the endorsement 
never became part of the insurance agreement. l28 
Third, the House court offered its "ordinary meaning" of when 
a claim was made without citing any authority for its definition.129 
The three-member dissent 130 addressed this point by stating, "[B]y 
attaching its own self-created labels to selected policy provisions, the 
majority clouds the interpretation and meaning of an essentially 
straightforward liability policy. "131 The dissent maintained that the 
majority created an ambiguity where none existed. 132 
The dissent then addressed the issue for which certiorari was 
granted-whether section 482 should apply to claims-made policies 
when the claim is not reported until after the policy period. 133 The 
122. [d. 
123. "The policy advises that '[w]e [i.e., St. Paul] have written this policy in plain 
English' and 'in clear, straightforward English.'" [d. at 334, 554 A.2d at 407. 
124. [d. at 340, 554 A.2d at 410. 
125. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. House, 73 Md. App. 118, 132, 533 
A.2d 301, 308 (1987), a/I'd, 315 Md. 328, 554 A.2d 404 (1989) ("The policy 
unambiguously states that a claim is made on the date an incident or injury is 
reported to St. Paul or its agent. "). 
126. Brief for Appellees at 35, House (No. 87-186). "According to the Appellees' 
policy, a claim is made only after the Appellees have 'reported,' or given 
notice, of the 'incident or injury' to the Appellant." [d. at 39. "The Appellees 
submit that the insurance policy provision ... is not ambiguous." [d. at 40. 
127. See Brief for Appellant at 1-2, House (No. 87-186); Brief for Appellees at 3, 
House (No. 87-186). 
128. See House, 315 Md. at 338-39, 554 A.2d at 409. 
129. See id. at 333, 554 A.2d at 407. 
130. Chief Judge Murphy authored the dissenting opinion, in which Judges McAuliffe 
and Blackwell joined. [d. at 341, 554 A.2d at 411 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). 
131. [d. at 342, 554 A.2d at 411 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). 
132. [d. (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). 
133. [d. at 343, 554 A.2d at 411 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). 
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dissent considered the purposes behind section 482,134 explained dif-
ferences between claims-made and occurrence policies,135 and analyzed 
the opinions of the courts in Do/an, City oj Harrisburg, and Zuck-
erman. 136 The dissent found that section 482 requires an insurer to 
prove that it was prejudiced only in situations where an insured 
breached an insurance policy. 137 The dissent reasoned that once Dr. 
House's claims-made policy expired, "[t]he policy could not be 
breached because there was no longer a policy to be breached. "138 
Therefore, the dissent concluded that since there was no coverage, 
there could be no breach and that as a result, section 482 should 
not have been applied by the trial court in House. 139 
One interpretation of House is that the court of appeals decided 
the case narrowly and held only that section 482 applied to the 
claims-made policy at issue under the facts of the case. The court 
of special appeals decision in House may be persuasive on other 
courts faced with the issue of whether section 482 applies to claims-
made policies. l40 Therefore, until either the court of appeals addresses 
the issue or the legislature chooses to intervene,141 Maryland tribunals 
134. Id. at 343-48, 554 A.2d at 411-14 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). 
135. Id. at 348-52, 554 A.2d at 414-16 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). 
136. Id. at 357-60, 554 A.2d at 418-20 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). 
137. Id. at 355, 554 A.2d at 417 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting) ("[Section] 482 encom-
passes a two-part test. Without the required breach of the notice provision, 
prejudice to the insurer is immaterial and the statute does not apply. "); see 
supra note 3 (quoting § 482) ("Where any insurer seeks to disclaim coverage 
... on the ground that the insured ... has breached the policy by failing to 
cooperate with the insurer or by not giving requisite notice to the insurer 
.... "). 
138. House, 315 Md. at 356, 554 A.2d at 418 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). "Any 
claim made after its expiration is of the same effect as an accident or event 
which occurs after the 'expiration' of an occurrence policy." Id. (Murphy, 
C.J., dissenting). 
139. Id. (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). 
140. For example, even after the court of appeal's decision in House, the court of 
special appeals' holding in House has continued to be cited by at least one 
commentator and in the annotations to § 482 as the law in Maryland. Anderson, 
Current Issues in Claims-Made Insurance Policies, 14 ALI-ABA COURSE MA-
TERIALS J. 57, 70 (Oct. 1989); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482 (1986 & Supp. 
1990) (annotations). 
141. During the 1988 legislative session of the General Assembly of Maryland, and 
between the court of special appeals and the court of appeals decisions in 
House, Senate Bill 503, entitled "AN ACT concerning Disclaimer of Coverage-
Claims-Made Insurance Policies," was proposed to amend § 482. See S. 503, 
1988 Md. Senate Bills. The proposed version of § 482 read as follows: 
(A) Where any insurer seeks to disclaim coverage on [any] A 
policy of liability insurance issued by it, on the ground that the insured 
or anyone claiming the benefits of the policy through the insured has 
breached the policy by failing to cooperate with the insurer or by not 
giving requisite notice to the insurer, such disclaimer shall be effective 
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may apply section 482 to claims-made policies even where a claim is 
not made during the policy period. 
If section 482 is applied to claims-made policies, claims-made 
insurers will be exposed to risks for a substantially broader period 
than the insureds have bargained for .142 Such an extension of coverage 
may significantly affect the actuarial basis upon which premiums 
have been calculated. 143 As the Insurance Commissioner of the State 
of Maryland argued in its amicus curiae brief before the court of 
appeals in House: "The end result could be that these lines of 
insurance will become unavailable, or prohibitively expensive, to 
Maryland insureds. "144 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co. v. House, declined to give its final word on whether 
Article 48A, section 482, of the Maryland Code applies to claims-
made insurance policies when an insured fails to notify its insurer of 
a claim until after the policy period has expired. The House court 
found that the policy at issue was ambiguous as to when a claim 
was made. Because of the ambiguity, there was room to find that 
Dr. House's claim was made during the policy period. As a result, 
the court of appeals held that section 482 applied to this particular 
policy in this given set of facts. 
The court of appeals, in so ruling, affirmed the court of special 
appeals which had held that section 482 applies to claims-made 
policies as a matter of law even when a claim is made after the 
policy period has expired. The court of special appeals holding leaves 
the continued existence of claims-made policies in a state of uncer-
tainty. As Maryland's Insurance Commissioner has suggested, re-
quiring an insurer to prove that it was actually prejudiced even where 
only if the insurer establishes, by a preponderance of affirmative 
evidence that such lack of cooperation or notice has resulted in actual 
prejudice to the insurer. 
(B) A SHOWING OF ACTUAL PREJUDICE TO THE IN-
SURER SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED WHEN COVERAGE IS DE-
NIED OR DISCLAIMED BASED ON LACK OF NOTICE TO THE 
INSURER UNDER A POLICY OF LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR 
WHICH COVERAGE IS PROVIDED ONLY FOR THOSE CLAIMS 
WHICH ARE REPORTED TO THE INSURER OR ITS AGENT 
WITHIN THE APPLICABLE POLICY PERIOD. 
[d. The demise of Senate Bill 503 does not appear to express the intent of the 
General Assembly, since the General Assembly never considered the bill on its 
merits. Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, House (No. 87-186) (citing Daily Record, 
Apr. 20, 1988, at 3, 9). 
142. See Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 304, 324, 495 A.2d 
395, 406 (1985); see also supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
143. See Zuckerman, 100 N.J. at 324, 495 A.2d at 406. 
144. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Maryland 
at 17, House (No. 87-186). 
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a policy had expired creates an unwarranted and unbargained-for 
extension of coverage, and may result in either the extinction of 
claims-made policies from the Maryland market or would make 
claims-made policies prohibitively expensive to Maryland consumers. 
Frederick W. Goundry, III 
